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This paper studies the impact of a key feature of competitive markets on moral 
behavior: the possibility that a competitor will step in and conclude the deal if a 
conscientious market actor forgoes a profitable business opportunity for ethical 
reasons. We study experimentally whether people employ the argument “if I 
don’t do it, someone else will” to justify taking a narrowly self-interested action. 
Our data reveal a clear pattern. Subjects do not employ the “replacement excuse” 
if a social norm exists that classifies the selfish action as immoral. But if no 
social norm exists, subjects are more inclined to take a selfish action in situations 
where another subject can otherwise take it. By demonstrating the importance of 
social norms of moral behavior for limiting the power of the replacement excuse, 
our paper informs the long-standing debate on the effect of markets on morals.  
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1 
“If we want to stop the defence industry operating in this country we can do so, and the result 
incidentally will be that someone else supplies the arms that we supply.”—Tony Blair1 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the founders of the Chicago school, Frank H. Knight, wrote in an early paper that “it must 
be conceded that the lines along which a competitive economic order tends to form character are 
often far from being ethically ideal” (1923, p. 591). The possibility that competitive markets erode 
morals has been debated ever since (for recent contributions see, e.g., Bowles 1998, Shleifer 2004, 
Satz 2010, Sandel 2012, Falk and Szech 2013, Bartling et al. 2015, Pigors and Rockenbach 2016, 
Kirchler et al. 2016). Data on the causal effect of markets on morals and, in particular, on the 
mechanisms by which markets might affect morals are however still scarce.  
This paper studies the impact of a key feature of competitive markets on moral behavior: 
the possibility that a competitor will rush in and cut the deal if a conscientious market actor forgoes 
a profitable business opportunity for ethical reasons. Suppose the conscientious market actor 
considers refusing to sell arms to a dictatorial regime. The only consequence of the refusal might 
be that a less scrupulous competitor will grab the chance; hence, the regime still receives the arms 
and the profits are passed to the competitor. In anticipation of this outcome, the conscientious 
market actor might sell the arms himself. The replacement excuse, that is, the argument that “if I 
don’t do it, someone else will,” has intuitive appeal and might lead even the most conscientious 
market actors to ignore their moral standards.  
The two main normative ethical theories disagree fundamentally on the justification the 
replacement excuse offers. From the viewpoint of consequentialist or utilitarian ethics, the 
replacement excuse provides justification for any action because outcomes alone matter for ethical 
assessment. Given that an unethical outcome will come about anyway (say, a dictatorial regime 
obtains new arms), taking the action that effectively implements the outcome (supplying the arms) 
does not change or worsen the outcome. The action is therefore not ethically wrong. Tony Blair, 
for instance, then UK prime minister, sought to justify an increase in UK arms exports in the 
introductory quote by claiming that a competitor would have stepped in had the UK refused to 
supply the arms. In contrast, deontological or duty ethics judges an action with respect to its 
adherence to a rule or principle. The fact that an unethical outcome will come about anyway does 
                                                          
1 Tony Blair, July 25, 2002: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100105053147/number10.gov.uk/page3000  
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not render the action that effectively implements the outcome ethically right: “If we accept this as 
a justification, it is hard to see what acts, however otherwise wicked, could not be defended in the 
same way” (Glover and Scott-Taggart 1975).   
This paper takes a positive approach and studies experimentally how people actually make 
decisions in situations where the replacement excuse is available. Do only outcomes matter for a 
market actor’s utility (utilitarianism) or do also his actions matter for his utility (deontological 
ethics)? If outcomes alone mattered for a market actor’s utility, he would always prefer to carry 
out a profitable but unethical business transaction himself rather than let someone else conclude 
the deal. Since the transaction will be implemented one way or another, own profits would be 
higher. This would imply that competitive markets erode moral standards by providing market 
actors with the replacement excuse. But if a market actor incurs a utility loss by taking an action 
that does not conform to the prevailing social norms of moral behavior (e.g., Elster 1989, Lindbeck 
1997, López-Pérez 2008, Krupka and Weber 2013), then he might not conclude the unethical 
transaction—even if forgoing it will make no difference and profits are passed on to a competitor.2 
This would imply that competitive markets do not necessarily undermine morals, at least not by 
way of the replacement excuse.3  
Our experimental design consists of a series of games, where players make binary choices 
between realizing a monetary gain (selfish outcome) and forgoing it for an altruistic reason (pro-
social outcome). In each game, only one player can realize the monetary gain, and the pro-social 
outcome will only materialize if all players, who decide sequentially, forgo the monetary gain. Our 
treatments vary the number of players who can realize the monetary gain if the first player in the 
sequence decides to forgo it. That is, we exogenously vary the likelihood that one of the subsequent 
players’ selfish choice will undo the first player's pro-social choice. Moreover, our games differ in 
the prevailing social norms. While our experimental measures show that the implementation of the 
selfish outcome is socially inappropriate and inconsistent with moral or proper social behavior in 
some of our games, no such norm exists in others.  
                                                          
2 The source of the utility loss can be self-image or identity concerns (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2005; Bodner 
and Prelec 2003; Bénabou and Tirole 2004, 2006, 2011; Köszegi 2006, Mazar et al. 2008), social image concerns (e.g., 
Akerlof 1980, Bernheim 1994, Andreoni and Bernheim 2009, Ariely et al. 2009), or the “cold prickle,” rather than the 
“warm glow,” of taking an action that does not conform to the prevailing social norms (Andreoni 1989, 1990, 1995). 
3 By studying the replacement excuse, our paper is related to a recent strand of papers on excuse driven behavior. The 
literature documents, for instance, that people employ self-serving interpretations of ambiguity and risk (Haisley and 
Weber 2010, Exley 2015), avoid information and exposure to sharing opportunities (Dana et al. 2006, 2007; Lazear et 
al. 2012, Andreoni et al. 2016), or use time to develop own excuses (Exley and Petrie 2016).  
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Our experimental design allows studying two questions. First, do players act more selfishly 
if they can employ the replacement excuse? That is, does the existence of subsequent players who 
could undo a first player’s altruistic choice promote selfish behavior by the first player? This would 
always be the case if people’s choices were guided by utilitarian ethics. The reason is that the 
opportunity cost of taking the pro-social choice (the monetary gain that is realized by implementing 
the selfish outcome) remains constant, while there is no guarantee that the pro-social outcome will 
ensue if a subsequent player’s selfish choice can undo it.  
Second, does the impact of the replacement excuse depend on the existence of a social norm 
of moral behavior? This would be the case if deontological ethics guided peoples’ choices, but not 
if people were utilitarian.4 If the implementation of the selfish outcome is consistent with the 
prevailing social norm of moral behavior, no norm is broken if the selfish action is taken; hence, 
there is no utility loss from taking the selfish action, and the predictions for deontological and 
utilitarian players coincide. If, however, the implementation of the selfish outcome is inconsistent 
with the prevailing social norm of moral behavior, taking the selfish action constitutes a norm 
deviation. Importantly, pointing to the fact that the selfish outcome is likely to ensue anyway does 
not justify the norm deviation from the viewpoint of deontological ethics. Consequently, a 
deontological player will not implement the selfish outcome simply because a subsequent player 
is likely to do so.  
Studying whether competitive markets and the replacement excuse lead people to behave 
in narrowly self-interested ways is of increasing importance because the “reach of markets, and 
market-oriented thinking, into aspects of life traditionally governed by nonmarket norms is one of 
the most significant developments of our time” (Sandel 2012, p. 7). Although a single ruthless 
competitor, or latent market entry of such a competitor, suffices to evoke the replacement excuse, 
behavior consistent with ethical conduct can be observed in many competitive markets. Financial 
services firms that are committed to ethical investment strategies—forgoing possibly more 
profitable investments in, say, arms manufacturing or tobacco—can serve as examples (e.g., 
Sparkes and Cowton 2004). With naturally occurring field data it is, however, difficult to separate 
true corporate social concern from reputational incentives or concerns about consumer demand 
                                                          
4 Note that social norms relate to actions, not outcomes. Elster (1989), for example, defines “social norm by the feature 
that they are not outcome-oriented. The simplest social norms are of the type: Do X, or: Don’t do X” (p. 99). Similarly, 
Ostrom (2000) defines social norms as “shared understandings about actions that are obligatory, permitted, or 
forbidden” (p. 143-144, emphasis added). 
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(e.g., Aupperle et al. 1985, Porter and Kramer 2006, Riedl and Smeets 2017). Ethical business 
practices can thus be compatible with the goal of profit-maximization, which renders it difficult to 
study when the replacement excuse gives rise to narrowly self-interested behaviors in the field and 
when it does not. In contrast, while being stylized and subject to concerns regarding external 
validity, our experimental approach allows us to control for confounding factors and to study the 
causal effect of the availability of the replacement excuse on behavior in a clean way.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 to 4 lay out the details of 
our experimental games and present the results. We draw conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2. Donation Game 
2.1 Experimental Design 
We study the effect of the availability of the replacement excuse on behavior in a simple donation 
game. Subjects make binary choices between receiving a payment of 20 CHF (about 21 USD) and 
having the experimenter transfer 60 CHF to FAIRMED, a Swiss charity, to finance the surgery of 
a leprosy patient in India.5  
 We conducted two experimental conditions of the donation game, as shown in Figure 1. 
The baseline condition is an individual decision task. A subject (player 1) decides to either take 20 
CHF (selfish outcome) or having the experimenter finance the surgery (altruistic outcome). The 
replacement condition is a three-player game. Subjects are randomly placed into groups of three 
and assigned the role of either player 1, 2, or 3. At most one player can take the 20 CHF and at 
most one surgery is financed per group. Players decide sequentially whether to take the 20 CHF. If 
a player decides to take the 20 CHF, the surgery is not financed and the game ends. The surgery is 
financed only if first player 1, then player 2, and finally player 3 forgoes taking the 20 CHF.  
The key feature of the experimental design is that player 1’s decision to forgo the 20 CHF 
cannot be replaced in the baseline condition, while we endow player 1 with the replacement excuse 
in the replacement condition. In the latter condition, player 1 can argue that if he does not take the 
20 CHF, player 2 or player 3 will do so. The design thus allows us to isolate the causal effect of 
                                                          
5 The experimental instructions provided basic facts about leprosy and the use of the donation. Leprosy is an infectious 
disease that causes damage of nerve cells and blockage of blood vessels, which can lead to bodily disfigurement. 
Although the disease can be cured, many leprosy victims suffer from stigmatization due to disfigurement. Often small 
surgical interventions can significantly reduce the scope of disfigurement. Almost 60 percent of the global leprosy 
cases occur in India. Funding an operation, which costs about 60 CHF on average and would allow for a life in dignity, 
is not possible for most of the victims with disfigurement due to the prevalence of poverty. 
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the availability of the replacement excuse by comparing the take rate (the fraction of players 1 who 
take the money) in the baseline condition to the take rate in the replacement condition. 
 
Baseline condition Replacement condition 
 
FIGURE 1. DONATION GAME 
 
To check the effectiveness of our experimental manipulation we elicited beliefs about the 
replacement probability (the probability that either player 2 or 3 will take the money if player 1 
does not do so) in the replacement condition. We implemented a between-subjects design to avoid 
the potential confound of ex-post rationalization (e.g., a subject stating a high replacement 
probability to justify having taken the money). The replacement probability is zero, by design, in 
the baseline condition. Our experimental manipulation is thus effective if subjects expect a positive 
replacement probability in the replacement condition. Subjects in the belief elicitation sessions 
received the instructions and control questions for the replacement condition. But instead of asking 
the subjects to choose between money and surgery, we asked them to state their beliefs about the 
replacement probability. Subjects had to enter integer numbers between 0 and 100 to indicate their 
beliefs in form of a percentage point and they earned 10 CHF if the stated belief was no further 
away than 5 percentage points from the true value. 
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Moreover, we measured the social norm regarding the decision to take the money, using a 
coordination game as measurement tool (Krupka and Weber 2013). We implemented a between-
subjects design and asked subjects, either for the baseline condition or for the replacement 
condition, whether player 1’s choice to take the 20 CHF would be rated by most people as “socially 
appropriate and consistent with moral or proper social behavior” or as “socially inappropriate and 
inconsistent with moral or proper social behavior” or as “neutral.” Subjects had to indicate their 
beliefs by choosing one of five options: (i) very socially inappropriate, (ii) somewhat socially 
inappropriate, (iii) neutral: neither socially inappropriate nor appropriate, (iv) somewhat socially 
appropriate, or (v) very socially appropriate. Importantly, we did not ask subjects to provide the 
rating they believe to be right, but the rating they believe the other subjects in the session most 
frequently chose. The social norm is assumed to serve as the coordination device in this game. 
Subjects received the instructions and control questions for the respective condition of the donation 
game. But instead of asking the subjects to choose between money and surgery, we asked the 
subjects to provide their beliefs about the most frequently given response. Subjects received a 
bonus of 10 CHF if their answers matched the modal response.  
2.2 Procedural Details 
All sessions took place at the laboratory of the Department of Economics at the University of 
Zurich. We implemented the study with z-Tree and h-Root (Fischbacher 2007; Block et al. 2014). 
Subjects were students from the University of Zurich and the ETH Zurich. 432 subjects participated 
in total. We conducted eight sessions of the donation game, with 67 subjects in the baseline 
condition and 177 subjects, i.e., 59 in each role, in the replacement condition. We used the strategy 
method for players 2 and 3 in the replacement condition. Sessions lasted about 45 minutes and 
subjects earned either 15 CHF (the show-up fee) or 35 CHF (if they took the 20 CHF); average 
earnings were CHF 19.75. Subjects’ choices resulted in 68 leprosy surgeries being financed, i.e., 
in a donation of 4080 CHF to FAIRMED. We elicited beliefs in the replacement condition from 
64 subjects. 124 subjects participated in the measurement of the social norm; 62 in each of the two 
conditions. Subjects earned either 10 CHF (if their answers qualified for the bonus) or 0 CHF; 
average earnings were 4.10 CHF. These measurements took about 15 minutes and were added at 
the end of unrelated experiments. No subject participated in our experiments more than once. The 
experimental instructions for all games and measurements are in the online appendix. 
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2.3 Predictions  
The behavioral predictions depend on the assumptions about subjects’ moral motivations. If 
subjects are guided by utilitarian ethics, then we should expect that the take rate is higher in the 
replacement condition than in the baseline condition. But if deontological ethics guide subjects, 
and if taking the 20 CHF constitutes a norm violation, then the take rate will not necessarily be 
higher in the replacement condition than in the baseline condition.  
To see this more formally, suppose first that subjects are utilitarian, so that utility is defined 
solely over outcomes. Let 𝑑𝑑 and 𝑚𝑚 denote the pro-social outcome (donation) and selfish outcome 
(money), respectively. A subject forgoes taking the money in the baseline condition if 𝑈𝑈(𝑑𝑑) >
𝑈𝑈(𝑚𝑚). Let 𝑝𝑝 denote the (belief about the) replacement probability in the replacement condition. A 
subject then takes the money if (1 − 𝑝𝑝) ∙ 𝑈𝑈(𝑑𝑑) < 𝑈𝑈(𝑚𝑚) ⇔ 𝑝𝑝 > �𝑈𝑈(𝑑𝑑) − 𝑈𝑈(𝑚𝑚)� 𝑈𝑈(𝑑𝑑)⁄ , i.e., if 𝑝𝑝 
is sufficiently large. Subjects with only a slight preference for the donation over taking the money 
in the baseline condition are thus likely to take the money instead in the replacement condition.  
Suppose next that subjects are deontological, so that utility is defined over outcomes and 
actions. Suppose further that taking the money in the donation game is socially inappropriate and 
inconsistent with moral behavior. Let 𝑐𝑐 denote the utility cost incurred by deviating from a social 
norm of moral behavior. A subject in the baseline condition then chooses the donation and not the 
money if 𝑈𝑈(𝑑𝑑) > 𝑈𝑈(𝑚𝑚) − 𝑐𝑐 and a subject in the replacement condition forgoes taking the money 
if (1 − 𝑝𝑝) ∙ 𝑈𝑈(𝑑𝑑) > 𝑈𝑈(𝑚𝑚) − 𝑐𝑐. Consequently, if the utility cost of deviating from the applicable 
social norm of moral behavior is sufficiently large, 𝑐𝑐 > 𝑈𝑈(𝑚𝑚), a subject will not even take the 
money if 𝑝𝑝 = 1 in the replacement condition.  
2.4 Results  
The grey bars in Figure 2 show that the take rates of players 1 are almost identical in the baseline 
condition and in the replacement condition, 23.9 percent (16 of 67) and 25.4 percent (15 of 59), 
respectively (p=0.50, Fischer exact test, one-sided). We observe these take rates despite the fact 
the replacement probability increases from 0, by design, in the baseline condition to 0.51 in the 
replacement condition, indicated by the black diamonds in Figure 2. Also the take rates of players 
2 and 3 in the replacement condition are very similar, 30.5 percent (18 of 59) and 28.8 percent (17 
of 59), respectively. We cannot reject that the take rate is identical across both conditions and all 
types of players (Pearson’s chi squared test, p=0.83). Note that players 2 could invoke the 
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replacement excuse as well, as their choice to forgo the 20 CHF might be replaced by player 3. In 
contrast, players 3 in the replacement condition are in the same strategic situation as players 1 in 
the baseline condition as their choice to forgo taking the money cannot be replaced. We summarize 
these findings in our first result. 
 
Result 1: Subjects do not use the replacement excuse in the donation game. The 
possibility that subsequent players can replace an earlier player’s decision not to 
take the money in the replacement condition does not result in take rates that are 
different from the baseline condition, where replacement is not possible. 
 
 
FIGURE 2. TAKE RATES AND REPLACEMENT PROBABILITIES IN THE DONATION GAMES 
 
 Notes: The grey bars show the take rates of all types of players in both conditions. The black diamonds 
indicate the respective replacement probabilities. The replacement probability is zero, by design, for players 
1 in the baseline condition and for players 3 in the replacement condition; it is 0.51 and 0.29 for players 1 
and 2 in the replacement condition, respectively. The figure illustrates that the take rates are very similar 
despite large differences in the replacement probabilities. 
 
 
Our manipulation check excludes the possibility that our treatment is ineffective. We find 
that 75 percent of the subjects state a strictly positive replacement belief.6 Hence, the large majority 
of subjects in our belief elicitation task expect that player 1’s altruistic choice to forgo the money 
                                                          
6 25 percent of the subjects stated beliefs of 5 percent, which could reflect a true belief of 0 percent. Subjects receive 
a bonus of 10 CHF if their stated belief is within 5 percentage points of the true value. The fact that no subject stated 
a belief lower than 5 percent is evidence that the subjects understood the monetary incentives in the elicitation task.  
0
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and enable the surgery in the replacement condition will be undone with positive probability by a 
subsequent player’s selfish choice. However, subjects tend to underestimate the replacement 
probability; the average belief is 0.23, while the true value is 0.51.7  
The finding that the replacement probability does not affect the take rate in the donation 
game is consistent with the possibility that deontological ethics guide subjects’ choices. A 
necessary condition for this interpretation to be correct is the existence of a social norm that taking 
the 20 CHF is inconsistent with moral behavior. Figure 3 illustrates that our measurements confirm 
the existence of a clear social norm. Averaged over both conditions, 97.6 percent of the subjects 
(121 of 124) rate the decision to take the 20 CHF as either “very socially inappropriate” or 
“somewhat socially inappropriate.” The former is the modal choice in both conditions. Not a single 
subject chose “somewhat appropriate” or “very appropriate” in either condition. The distribution 
of the ratings is virtually identical in both conditions (p=0.80, Mann Whitney U test). The latter 
finding indicates that the availability of the replacement excuse does not render it more appropriate 
to take the 20 CHF, which is in itself consistent with Result 1. We summarize the measurement of 
the social norm in our second result. 
 
Result 2: A strong social norm of moral behavior exists in the donation game. Almost 
all subjects rate the decision to take the 20 CHF, instead of enabling a leprosy 
surgery in India, as either “very socially inappropriate” or “somewhat socially 
inappropriate” in both the baseline and the replacement condition.  
 
In sum, we find that subjects do not use the replacement excuse in our donation games, 
where a strong social norm exists that taking the 20 CHF is inconsistent with moral or proper social 
behavior. These data suggest that competitive institutions and the associated replacement excuse 
do not necessarily lead to the erosion of moral behavior.  
 
                                                          
7 This observation is consistent with existing research showing that subjects systematically underestimate the 
probability of disjunctive events, such as drawing at least one “take” in a sequence of two; see, e.g., Bar-Hillel (1973). 
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 Notes: The bars show the measures of the social appropriateness of taking the 20 CHF, instead of enabling 
a leprosy surgery in India, in both conditions. The figure illustrates that vast majority of subjects believe that 
the choice to take the 20 CHF would be rated by most people as either very inappropriate or somewhat 
inappropriate. Almost no subject believes that most people would rate the choice to take the 20 CHF as 
neutral and no subject believes that most people would rate this choice as appropriate in either condition.  
 
 
3. Take Games with and without Punishment 
Our Result 1, the irrelevance of the availability of the replacement excuse in the donation game, 
challenges often-held intuitions. For example, Falk and Szech (2013) write: “This ‘replacement’ 
logic is a common feature of markets, and it is therefore not surprising that the rhetoric of traders 
often appeals to the phrase that ‘if I don’t buy or sell, someone else will’” (p. 710).  
In the following, we analyze behavior in two different games, using a different subject pool 
and different stake sizes, to check the robustness of Result 1. We want to rule out the possibility 
that behavior in the donation game is an exception, driven, for instance, by an exceptionally strong 
social norm that taking the 20 CHF and thereby defeating the leprosy surgery in India is 
inconsistent with moral behavior.  
3.1 Experimental Design 
We conducted a series of simple take games to revisit the question whether the replacement excuse 
encourages narrowly self-interested behaviors. Take Game 1 (TG-1) consists of two players: A and 
B1, who both start with an endowment of 0.5 USD. Player B1 choses to either take away 0.4 USD 
from player A or to refrain from doing so. Player A cannot take an action. If B1 takes the money, 
 
FIGURE 3. SOCIAL NORMS IN THE DONATION GAMES 
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player A’s payoff is 0.1 USD and player B1’s payoff is 0.9 USD; if B1 does not take the money 
both players receive their endowments of 0.5 USD. Take Game 2 (TG-2) is different from TG-1 
only in that it consists of three players: A, B1, and B2, who all have endowments of 0.5 USD. First, 
B1 can take away 0.4 USD from A. If B1 does not take the 0.4 USD, then B2 can do so. Finally, 
Take Game 3 (TG-3) is different only in that it consists of four players: A, B1, B2, and B3. If 
neither B1 nor B2 takes the money, B3 can finally do so.  
The key feature of the experimental design is the exogenous variation of the number of 
players who can replace player B1’s pro-social choice not to take away the money from player A. 
That is, we vary the replacement probability by treatment. Comparison of the take rates of players 
B1 in conditions TG-1, TG-2, and TG-3 allows for a first robustness check of Result 1.  
As a manipulation check, we measured the beliefs that player B1's decision to forgo taking 
the 0.4 USD from player A will be replaced by player B2 in TG-2 or by players B2 or B3 in TG-3, 
respectively. We also elicited the social norm that applies to player B1’s decision to take the 0.4 
USD from player A in each of the three conditions. We used the same methods as in the donation 
game to measure replacement beliefs and social norms. 
Moreover, we conducted three additional conditions of the take games that feature a 
punishment option for player A. The take games with punishment, TG-P-1, TG-P-2, and TG-P-3, 
are identical to TG-1, TG-2, and TG-3, respectively, except that player A can spend up to 5 USD 
cents of his payoff to punish a player B who took the money away. For each 1 USD cent player A 
spends, the targeted player B's payoff decreases by 10 USD cents. Players B who do not take money 
away from player A cannot be punished. Adding a punishment option for player A provides for a 
second robustness check of Result 1, in a game where the incentive to take the 0.4 USD from player 
A is reduced because it might result in monetary punishment. Moreover, the punishment data allow 
studying whether the replacement excuse provides justification for the act of taking the money 
from the viewpoint of the “victim.” In TG-P-3, for example, do players A consider players B1, 
who are endowed with the replacement excuse, less worthy of punishment for taking the money 
than players B3, who are not endowed with the replacement excuse?  
Table 1 provides an overview of our treatment conditions and additional measurements, 
and it shows the respective numbers of observation.8   
 
                                                          
8 We did not repeat the measurements of beliefs and norms in the conditions with punishment to economize on subjects.  
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TABLE 1. OVERVIEW OF TAKE GAME CONDITIONS AND NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS  
Condition Role  Additional Measurements 
 A B1 B2 B3  Social Norm  Replacement Belief  
TG-1 126 126 - -  126 - 
TG-2 108 108 108 -  110 104 
TG-3 108 108 108 108  100 104 
TG-P-1 101 101 - -  - - 
TG-P-2 112 112 112 -  - - 
TG-P-3 100 100 100 100  - - 
 
3.2 Procedural Details 
Subjects were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), an online labor market (see, e.g., 
Horton et al. 2011). Participation was restricted to U.S. workers with at least 500 completed 
assignments and a minimum approval rating of 95 percent. We implemented the experiment with 
the software o-Tree (Chen et al. 2016). We controlled the subjects’ understanding of the 
instructions by asking a set of test questions. Subjects could not participate if they were not able to 
provide correct answers within two attempts. All experimental instructions and test questions are 
in the online appendix. Overall, 2486 workers participated. We randomized workers who clicked 
the link to our study into treatments and roles or into a norm or belief measurement task. We used 
the strategy method for players B2 and B3 in the conditions with and without punishment. We also 
used the strategy method for players A in the punishment conditions. For example, player A in TG-
P-3 made three punishment decisions, one for each player B who could have taken the money. We 
stopped the data collection once we had 100 observations in each cell. Due to the random 
assignment, we obtained more than 100 observations is some games and measurement tasks; see 
Table 1. Subjects could participate only once. Each subject received a fixed payment of 0.50 USD 
and earned a variable payoff on top. The variable payment depended on the choices of players B 
and, if applicable, the punishment behavior of players A, as explained in Section 3.1. Subjects in 
the belief and norm measurement tasks earned 3 additional USD if their norm ratings matched the 
modal response or if their beliefs of the replacement probability were not further away than 5 
percentage points from the true value, respectively. On average, the workers received a total 
payment (fixed payment plus variable payment) of 1.07 USD and took about 6 minutes to complete 
the study, translating to an average hourly rate of about 10.70 USD.  
 
 
13 
3.3 Predictions  
As in the donation game in Section 2, the behavioral predictions depend on the assumptions about 
subjects’ moral motivations. If subjects are utilitarian, then we should expect that the take rates 
will be higher in the conditions with possible replacement, TG-2 and TG-3, than in the condition 
without replacement, TG-1.  The same holds for the respective conditions with punishment. But if 
subjects’ choices are guided by deontological ethics and if taking the 0.4 USD from player A 
constitutes a norm violation, then the take rates in TG-1 and TG-P-1 will not necessarily be 
different from the take rates in the respective conditions with possible replacement. 
3.4 Results  
We report the data from the take game (without punishment) first. The grey bars in the left panel 
of Figure 4 show that the take rates of players B1 are similar in all three conditions, 68.3 percent 
(86 of 126) in TG-1, 63.9 percent (69 of 108) in TG-2, and 60.2 percent (65 of 108) in TG-3. We 
cannot reject that the take rates are identical (p=0.44, Pearson’s chi-square test). We observe these 
take rates even though the replacement probability increases from 0, by design, in TG-1 to 0.69 in 
TG-2 and 0.89 in TG-3, indicated by the black diamonds in Figure 4. The take rates of players B2 
in TG-2 and of players B2 and B3 in TG-3 are equally similar, 68.5 percent (74 of 108), 67.6 
percent (73 of 108), and 64.8 percent (70 of 108), respectively. We cannot reject that the choices 
of all types of players B in all conditions originate from the same distribution (Pearson’s chi square 
test, p=0.36).9 We summarize this finding in our next result.  
 
Result 3: Subjects do not use the replacement excuse in the take games. The 
possibility that subsequent players B can replace an earlier player B’s decision not 
to take the money from player A does not affect take rates. 
                                                          
9 Note that the number of players is not constant between our conditions with and without replacement, neither in the 
donation game nor in the take game. While this can be considered as a natural feature arising from the fact that the 
possibility of replacement comes with the presence of additional players, we want to exclude the possibility that simply 
adding players affects behavior. For example, if B1 is sensitive to the size of the “audience” in the take game, this 
could lead to lower take rates in TG-2 and TG-3, where one and two other players B, respectively, are informed about 
B1’s choice, than in TG-1, where no other player B is informed about B1’s choice. To test for an “audience effect” 
(Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009), we conducted a control condition on AMT that is identical to TG-1, except that it is 
common knowledge that two passive players are added, acting as an “audience,” each receiving 0.5 USD and getting 
informed about B1’s decision. We collected 107 novel observations for B1 in TG-1 and 109 observations for B1 in the 
new condition with spectators; hence, a total of 650 workers participated in the control study. The experimental 
instructions are in the online appendix. We find that the take rates of B1s are not different in the treatments with and 
without an audience, 56.9 percent (62 of 109) and 61.7 percent (66 of 107), respectively (p=0.28, Fischer exact test, 
one-sided). We conclude that “audience effects” do not explain the irrelevance of the replacement excuse in our games. 
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The manipulation check reveals that 98.1 percent (102 of 104) and 96.0 percent (96 of 100) 
of the subjects believe that the replacement probability for player B1 is strictly positive in TG-2 
and TG-3, respectively.10 The average belief in TG-2, 0.61, is close to the true value, 0.69. The 
average belief in TG-3 is 0.65, while the true value is 0.89. That is, as in the replacement condition 
of the donation game, subjects underestimate on average the replacement probability when more 
than one subject can replace the first player’s pro-social choice. Importantly, however, even though 
replacement beliefs are much higher in the take games than in the donation game (0.61 and 0.65, 
compared to 0.23), our main result that subjects do not make use of the replacement excuse is 
replicated in the take games. 
 
  
FIGURE 4. TAKE RATES AND REPLACEMENT PROBABILITIES IN THE TAKE GAMES 
 
Notes: The grey bars show the take rates in the take game (left panel) and the take game with punishment 
(right panel). The black diamonds indicate the respective replacement probabilities. The figure illustrates 
that our main result on the irrelevance of the replacement excuse for the frequency of narrowly self-
interested choices in the donation game replicates in both take games. The take rates within each game are 
very similar, despite large differences in the replacement probabilities. 
 
Result 3 is again consistent with the possibility that deontological ethics guide subjects’ 
choices. As in the donation game, a necessary condition for this interpretation to be correct is the 
existence of a clear social norm that taking the 0.4 USD from player A is inconsistent with moral 
                                                          
10 Four subjects stated a belief of 5 percent, which could reflect a true belief of 0 percent. Only 2 of 204 subjects stated 
a belief of less than 5 percent, suggesting that the vast majority of the subjects understood the monetary incentives.  
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behavior. Figure 5 illustrates that our measurements confirm the existence of a clear social norm. 
In total, 82 percent of the subjects rate player B1’s decision to take the money from player A as 
either “very” or “somewhat socially inappropriate.” The latter is the modal response, chosen by 46 
percent of the subjects. No significant differences in the norm ratings exist between TG-1, TG-2, 
and TG-3 (Kruskal-Wallis test, H(2)=3.91, p=0.14). This shows that the availability of the 
replacement excuse does not render it more appropriate to take the 0.4 USD from player A, which 
is in itself consistent with Result 3. We summarize these findings in the following.  
 
Result 4: A clear social norm exists in the take game. The large majority of subjects 
rate player B1’s decision to take 0.4 USD from player A as either “somewhat socially 
inappropriate” or “very socially inappropriate” in all three conditions.  
 
 Notes: The bars show the measures of the social appropriateness of taking the 0.4 USD from player A in all 
three conditions. The figure illustrates that large majority of subjects believe that the choice to take the 0.4 
USD from player A would be rated by most people as either very inappropriate or somewhat inappropriate 
in all three conditions. 
 
 
We next turn to the take games with punishment. The grey bars in the right panel of Figure 4 
show that the take rates of players B1 are very similar in all three conditions, 36.6 percent (37 of 
101) in TG-P-1, 32.1 percent (36 of 112) in TG-P-2, and 25.0 percent (25 of 100) in TG-P-3. We 
cannot reject that these take rates are identical (Pearson’s chi-square test, p=0.20). We obtain this 
result even though the replacement probability increases from 0, by design, in TG-P-1 to 0.29 in 
 
FIGURE 5. SOCIAL NORM IN THE TAKE GAME 
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TG-P-2, and to 0.47 in TG-P-3, as shown by the black diamonds. The take rates of players B2 in 
TG-P-2 and of players B2 and B3 in TG-P-3 are equally similar, 29.5 percent (33 of 112), 28.0 
percent (28 of 100), and 27.0 percent (27 of 100), respectively. We cannot reject that the choices 
of all players B in all three conditions originate from the same distribution (Pearson’s chi square 
test, p=0.24).11 We summarize this result as follows. 
 
Result 5: Subjects do not use the replacement excuse in the take games with 
punishment. The take rates are identical in all three conditions. 
 
In sum, the behavior observed in the take games replicates the results obtained in the 
donation game. In two versions of the take game, with and without punishment, we find that 
subjects do not make use of the replacement excuse, a context where a clear social norm exists 
(measured in the take game without punishment) that taking the 0.4 USD is inconsistent with moral 
or proper social behavior. 
We finally report the punishment data, which allows studying whether players A accept the 
replacement excuse. Do players A who lost 0.4 USD, i.e., the “victims,” punish less when a player 
B’s pro-social choice not to take the money could have been replaced? Our data show that this is 
not the case. Players B1 and B2 in condition TG-P-2 were punished at virtually identical levels if 
they took the 0.4 USD from player A, leading to an average punishment of 0.26 USD for both types 
of players B. Also the average punishment of players B1, B2, and B3 is very similar when they 
took the 0.4 USD from player A in condition TG-P-3, 0.19, 0.19, and 0.21 USD, respectively, and 
not significantly different (Friedman test, p=0.83). These findings are consistent with Result 3.12 
We summarize the punishment data as follows.  
 
Result 6: From the point of view of players A, possible replacement of the pro-social 
choice is not an acceptable excuse for making the selfish choice in the take games. 
Within our conditions, Players A punish all types of players B equally for taking the 
money, independently of their positions in the sequence.  
                                                          
11 It is noteworthy that the threat of punishment reduces the take rate significantly compared to the conditions without 
punishment (Fisher exact test, one sided, p<0.01 for all possible bilateral comparisons). While this is not surprising in 
itself, it shows that workers on AMT react sensibly to incentives. This suggests that the absence of the replacement 
effect in the take games is not driven by a general insensitivity of AMT workers to experimental variations.  
12 Average punishment of players B1 in TG-P-1 for taking the 0.4 USD from player A is 0.29 USD. Punishment thus 
appears to be lower in conditions with a larger numbers of players B. 
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4. Ultimatum Games with Responder Competition 
We demonstrated in three different games in Sections 2 and 3 that subjects do not employ the 
replacement excuse. The games share the social norm that implementing the respective selfish 
outcome is inconsistent with proper social behavior. Our interpretation of these empirical results 
was that subjects are guided by deontological ethics, where the argument that the selfish outcome 
is likely to come about anyway does not justify deviations from a social norm. To further test this 
interpretation, we turn to the study of ultimatum games with responder competition in this section.  
It is a well-known finding that even very low offers are frequently accepted in ultimatum 
games with responder competition, where multiple responders can accept an offer. The same low 
offers are, in contrast, mostly rejected in standard ultimatum games with a single responder (e.g., 
Güth et al. 1998, Grosskopf 2003, Fischbacher et al. 2009).13 For example, the rejection rate of a 
10-percent-offer in the ultimatum games in Fischbacher et al. (2009) is 0.80 in the standard game 
with a single responder but only 0.46 in a game with two responders and 0.26 in a game with five 
responders (leading to expected rejection probabilities of 0.21 and 0.001, respectively). Rejecting 
a low offer in a standard ultimatum game ensures that the proposer will be punished, e.g., with 
intent to enforce a fairness norm (Fehr and Gächter 2002). Rejecting a low offer in an ultimatum 
game with responder competition, however, will not ensure that the proposer is punished because 
an offer will only be rejected if every single responder rejects. Apparently, many responders in 
games with competition do not want to pay the cost of punishing the proposer, which is incurred 
by rejecting a low offer. A possible explanation is that responders invoke the replacement excuse 
in these games and argue that “if I don’t accept the low offer, another responder will do so.” 
How can our results in the donation and take games be reconciled with the existing results 
on responder behavior in ultimatum games? A necessary condition for our interpretation of the 
findings in Sections 2 and 3 to be correct and to generalize to other games is the absence of a social 
norm that accepting a low offer in an ultimatum game is inconsistent with moral or proper social 
behavior. In this case, the prediction for deontological players coincides with that for utilitarian 
players because no social norm exists that guides the decision whether to accept or reject a low 
offer. Consequently, irrespective of whether responders follow a utilitarian or a deontological 
                                                          
13 Multiple responders decide simultaneously in these games. One of the accepting responders is randomly determined 
to receive the offer if more than one responder accepts. An offer is rejected only if all responders reject. 
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fairness view, they will more frequently accept a low offer if the only consequence of rejecting the 
offer is that other responders get the chance to accept it.  
4.1 Experimental Design 
We conducted a series of ultimatum games in which we vary the numbers of responders. Ultimatum 
Game 1 (UG-1) is a standard, binary ultimatum game with two players, one proposer (player A) 
and one responder (player B1). Player A can either split 1 USD equally or make a low offer of 0.1 
USD to player B1 to keep 0.9 USD for himself. The equal split is automatically implemented (for 
simplicity) but player B1 can decide whether to accept the low offer, in which case the unequal 
split is implemented, or to reject it, in which case both players receive nothing. Ultimatum Game 
2 (UG-2) is different from UG-1 only in that it consists of three players: A, B1, and B2. If player 
A proposes the equal split, A and B1 each receive 0.5 USD and B2 receives nothing. If player A 
makes the low offer, players B1 and B2 decide sequentially whether to accept it. If B1 rejects the 
low offer, B2 can accept it. The player B who accepts the low offer receives the 0.1 USD, the 
respectively other player B receives nothing. The low offer is finally rejected only if both players 
B reject it. Ultimatum Game 3 (UG-3) is different from UG-2 only in that a third responder, B3, is 
added. If first B1and then B2 reject the low offer, B3 can finally accept it.14   
The key feature of the experimental design is the exogenous variation of the number of 
players who can replace player B1’s choice to reject the low offer. Comparison of the rejection 
rates of players B1 in UG-1, UG-2, and UG-3 allows studying if the existing results on responder 
behavior in ultimatum games with responder competition replicate in our setting.  
As a manipulation check, we measured the beliefs that player B1's decision to reject the 
low offer will be replaced by that of player B2 in UG-2 or by that of players B2 or B3 in UG-3, 
respectively. Finally, we elicited the social norm that applies to player B1’s decision to accept the 
low offer in each of the three conditions. We used the same methods as in the donation and take 
games to measure replacement beliefs and social norms.   
Table 2 provides an overview of our treatment conditions and additional measurements, 
and it shows the respective numbers of observation.  
 
 
                                                          
14 We implemented a sequential version of ultimatum games with responder competition to minimize the differences 
with respect to our take games. Also the stake size and possible payoff differences among players are held constant.  
 
 
19 
TABLE 2. OVERVIEW OF ULTIMATUM GAME CONDITIONS AND NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS  
Condition Role  Additional Measurements 
 A B1 B2 B3  Social Norm  Replacement Belief  
UG-1 109 109 - -  111 - 
UG-2 106 106 106 -  102 104 
UG-3 101 101 101 101  100 102 
 
4.2 Procedural Details 
Subjects were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). Participation restrictions and other 
methods were exactly as in the take games. All instructions and test questions are in the online 
appendix. Overall, 1459 workers participated. Each subject received a fixed payment of 0.50 USD 
and earned a variable payoff on top. The variable payment depends on the choices of players A 
and, in case of a low offer, the acceptance decision of players B, as explained in Section 4.1. 
Subjects in the belief and norm measurement tasks could earn additional 3 USD, exactly as in the 
take games. On average, the workers received a total payment of 1.13 USD and took about 6 
minutes to complete the study, translating to an average hourly rate of about 11.30 USD. 
4.3 Predictions  
We expect our implementation of ultimatum games with responder competition to replicate the 
results reported in the literature. That is, we expect players B1 to more frequently accept the low 
offer in UG-2 than in UG-1 and more frequently in UG-3 than in UG-2. Moreover, we hypothesize 
that no social norm exists that accepting the low offer is inconsistent with moral or proper social 
behavior.  
4.4 Results 
The grey bars in Figure 6 show the acceptance rates of the low offer by players B1 in all three 
conditions. 51 percent of players B1 accept the low offer in the standard ultimatum game UG-1. 
The acceptance rate is significantly higher, 74 percent, in condition UG-2, where player B2 can 
accept the low offer if player B1 rejects it (p<0.01, Fisher exact test). The acceptance rate increases 
further, to 85 percent, in condition UG-3, where players B2 and, if not B2, then B3 can accept the 
low offer in case B1 rejects it (UG-3 vs. UG-1, p<0.01; UG-3 vs. UG-2, p=0.06; Fisher exact 
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tests).15 The black diamonds in Figure 6 indicate the replacement probabilities; it is zero, by design, 
in UG-1 but increases to 0.80 and 0.98 in UG-2 and UG-3, respectively. We summarize these 
findings in the following.  
 
Result 7: The possibility that subsequent responders can accept and thereby replace 
the first responder’s decision to reject a low offer in the ultimatum game significantly 
increases the rate at which the first responder accepts the low offer.  
 
 
 Notes: The grey bars show the acceptance rates of the first responder in the three conditions. The black 
diamonds indicate the replacement probabilities. The replacement probability is zero, by design, for the 
responder in UG-1; it is 0.80 and 0.98 for the first responder in UG-2 and UG-3, respectively. The figure 
illustrates that the acceptances rates increase as the replacement probability increases. 
 
 
Our replication of the result that responders accept low offers more frequently in ultimatum 
games with responder competition than in ultimatum games with a single responder already 
indicates that our treatment manipulation was effective. Our manipulation check revealing that the 
vast majority of subjects expect a positive replacement probability (but underestimate it on 
                                                          
15 We focus on the acceptance decisions by players B1 because the sequential order of moves of the responders implies 
that the low offer is the kindest action that is available to player A from the point of view of players B2 and B3; they 
receive nothing if player A splits equally with player B1. The acceptance rates of players B2 and B3 are accordingly 
high; 0.8, 0.86, and 0.82 for B2 in UG-2, B2 and B3 in UG-3, respectively. 
 
FIGURE 6.  ACCEPTANCE RATES AND REPLACEMENT PROBABILITIES IN THE ULTIMATUM GAMES  
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average) confirms this.16 Moreover, we cannot reject that the beliefs in the ultimatum games and 
the take games, which are equal in terms of stake sizes and subject pool and thus lend themselves 
to being compared, are identical (UG-2 vs. TG-2, p=0.14; UG-3 vs. TG-3, p=0.82; Mann Whitney 
U tests). This indicates that differences in beliefs do not explain why the replacement excuse is 
effective in the ultimatum games but not in the take games. 
The finding that the replacement probability affects the acceptance rate in the ultimatum 
games would be consistent with the possibility that subjects’ choices are guided by deontological 
ethics—as our results in the donation and take games suggest—if no social norm existed that 
accepting a low offer is inconsistent with moral behavior. This possibility is supported by the data. 
Figure 7 shows that the modal response in all three condition is that accepting the low offer is 
“neutral: neither socially inappropriate nor appropriate,” chosen by 33.5 percent of all subjects. 
38.0 percent of the subjects rate player B1’s decision to accept the low offer as either “very” or 
“somewhat socially appropriate,” and only 28.4 percent choose “very” or “somewhat socially 
inappropriate.” There is no significant difference in the norm ratings between UG-1, UG-2, and 
UG-3 (Kruskal-Wallis test, H(2)= 1.03, p=0.60). These data clearly indicate that there is no 
common understanding that accepting a low offer is socially inappropriate. We summarize the 
measurement of the social norm as follows.  
 
Result 8: No social norm exists that accepting a low offer in the ultimatum game is 
socially inappropriate and inconsistent with moral or proper social behavior.  
 
In sum, we replicate the existing result that responders accept low offers at a higher rate in 
ultimatum games with responder competition than in standard games without competition. 
Importantly, our data indicate that no social norm exists that governs the decision whether to accept 
or reject a low offer in an ultimatum game. Hence, preferences over outcomes solely guide even 
deontological responders' choices, and if the only consequence of rejecting a low offer is that 
another responder will be able to accept the offer, most responders prefer accepting the low offer 
right away. The responders' behavior in ultimatum games with multiple responders is thus 
consistent with our interpretation of the behavioral patterns in the donation and take game.  
                                                          
16 We find that 97.1 percent of the subjects believe that the replacement probability is strictly positive in UG-2 (101 of 
104) and UG-3 (99 of 102). As in the take games, four subjects stated a belief of 5 percent, which could reflect a true 
belief of 0 percent, given the incentive structure. Only two subjects stated a belief of less than 5 percent. The average 
beliefs are 0.64 and 0.62 in UG-2 and UG-3, respectively. 
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 Notes: The bars show the measures of the social appropriateness of accepting the low offer in all three 
conditions. The figure illustrates that the modal response in all three conditions is that subjects believe that 
the first responder’ choice to accept the low offer would be rated by most people as neutral.  
 
 
4.5 Additional norm measurement in the laboratory 
As a final test, we measure the social norms regarding responder behavior in ultimatum games in 
the laboratory, using the experimental design by Fischbacher et al. (2009). We hypothesize that we 
can replicate Result 8, which is based on data obtained on AMT, with data obtained in a standard 
laboratory subject pool. Fischbacher et al.’s study was run in the laboratory of the Department of 
Economics at the University of Zurich, where we also ran our measurement of the applicable social 
norm. We provided the subjects with Fischbacher et al.’s original instructions and test questions 
from either the ultimatum game with a single responder or the ultimatum game with two competing 
responders. We then asked the subjects to state their beliefs about how most people would rate a 
responder’s choice to accept a 10-percent-offer in the respective ultimatum game. The same five 
options were available that we used to measure social norms throughout the paper. Subjects 
received a bonus of 10 CHF if their answers matched the modal response. We elicited beliefs in 
the standard ultimatum game from 63 subjects and in the ultimatum game with two competing 
responders from 69 subjects. The measurement of the social norms was added at the end of 
unrelated experiments; it took about 15 minutes and subjects earned 3.27 CHF on average. 
 
FIGURE 7. SOCIAL NORM IN THE ULTIMATUM GAMES  
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We find that the modal response in the standard ultimatum game is that accepting the low 
offer is “neutral: neither socially inappropriate nor appropriate,” chosen by 31.7 percent of the 
subjects. A similar fraction of subjects, 30.4 percent, chose the “neutral” option in the ultimatum 
game with two responders. We cannot reject that the norm ratings in the two conditions are identical 
(p=0.69, Mann Whitney U test). Overall, only 27.3 percent rate the decision to accept the low offer 
as either “very” or “somewhat socially inappropriate.” These ratings are very similar to the ratings 
obtained on AMT. We cannot reject that the ratings elicited in the laboratory (both conditions 
pooled) and the ratings elicited on AMT (all three conditions pooled) are identical (p=0.43, Mann 
Whitney U test).17 The measurement of the social norms regarding responder behavior in the 
laboratory thus confirm the measurements on AMT, which are summarized in Result 8. 
 
5. Conclusion  
We studied experimentally if people make use of the “replacement excuse”—the argument “if I 
don’t do it, someone else will”—to justify narrowly self-interested behaviors. A key feature of 
competitive markets is that a competitor can step in if a responsible market actor forgoes a business 
opportunity for ethical reasons. Our leading example was a market actor who considered refusing 
to sell arms to a dictatorial regime. If the only consequence of refusing to sell the arms was that a 
competitor could conclude the deal, the refusal might make no difference except that the profits 
that accrue from selling the arms are passed on to the competitor. The forces of competition would 
undermine the moral standards of the responsible market actor if, in anticipation of this outcome, 
he sells the arms himself.  
It is a long-standing hypothesis that market interaction affects moral behavior. One theory, 
originating in the eighteenth century, asserts that markets are “civilizing.” An example is Marquis 
de Condorcet, who claimed that “Manners have become more gentle […] through the influence of 
the spirit of commerce and industry” (1795; as quoted in Hirschman, 1982, p. 1465). An opposed 
theory, of which Marx is a prominent representative, asserts that the “modes of production and of 
exchange” have “left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest” 
                                                          
17 We obtain the same measures of the social norm despite differences in the design of the respective ultimatum games. 
In particular, proposers in Fischbacher et al.’s design could offer any integer percentage amount of their endowment. 
In contrast, we implemented a binary version where the proposer could offer either the equal split or 10 percent of the 
endowment. Moreover, multiple responders decided simultaneously whether or not to accept an offer in Fischbacher 
et al., whereas responders made their acceptance decisions in a sequential order in our design.  
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(Marx and Engels, 1848, Ch. 1). Causal evidence on the effect of markets on morals and, in 
particular, on the mechanisms by which markets might affect morals is however still scarce. The 
contribution of our paper is to provide clean experimental evidence on one potentially powerful 
mechanism—the replacement excuse—by which competitive markets might erode morals.  
Our data revealed a clear behavioral pattern, consistently found in a series of games and in 
two different subject pools. People do not use the argument “if I don’t do it, someone else will” to 
justify taking a narrowly self-interested action if a social norm exists classifying the selfish action 
as immoral—even when another subject is likely to replace the omission of the action. But if no 
social norm exists classifying the selfish action as immoral, subjects more often take the selfish 
action when an omission of the action can be replaced by another subject.  
By demonstrating that social norms can outweigh the forces of competition, our paper 
informs the long-standing debate on the effect of markets on morals. While one should be careful 
about drawing general conclusions from the results of a single study, our data suggest that 
competitive markets do not necessarily undermine morals—at least not by way of the replacement 
excuse.  
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